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    Abstract.  Economies of scale have led to the
production of animals at large confined facilities
concentrated in selected regions.  Such production has
been accompanied by environmental problems including
the degradation of water quality.  Both state and federal
governments have enacted new legislation and regulatory
provisions to respond to problems created by concentrated
animal feeding operations.  The emphasis of the adopted
provisions has been on eliminating pollution and
environmental degradation from animal wastes.  A major
consideration has been to reduce nutrient contamination
of waters which occurs due to excessive applications of
manure from large, concentrated operations.  
Two possibilities can be examined to devise more
successful mechanisms for controlling pollution from
animals.  First, more detailed regulations may better
define which practices and operations need to be
monitored as point sources of pollution.  This might allow
monitoring agencies to focus their efforts on smaller
numbers of producers.  Second, state governments may
need new mechanisms for the more assertive
enforcement of existing regulations.  
INTRODUCTION
    As animal feeding operations (AFOs) have expanded
into larger concentrated animal feeding operations
(CAFOs), animal production has come under increased
scrutiny.  CAFOs are AFOs that exceed a defined
number of confined animals and meet other criteria
delineated by federal or state law.  During the past 40
years, our country has experienced a 92% decrease in the
number of hog farms, a 93% reduction of farms with
dairy cows, a 71% reduction in the number of poultry
operations, and a 55% decrease in cattle operations (US
Department of Agriculture, 1963; US Department of
Agriculture, 1998).  During this same period, cattle
numbers (excluding dairy) have increased by about 10%
while hog numbers have decreased nearly 11%.  With
large numbers of animals at individual locations, excessive
amounts of animal waste are impairing water supplies
(Letson et al., 1998; Gollehon et al., 2001).
Two strategies may be offered to respond to the
environmental conditions caused by CAFOs.  First,
governments may adopt regulations that more definitively
regulate polluters, including risks of pollution.  Second,
regulators might engage in greater enforcement efforts
with respect to existing regulations.  The adoption of
either of these strategies may obviate the need to regulate
more AFOs using National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permits.
MORE DEFINITIVE PROVISIONS
In the main, regulations addressing alleged
contamination from AFOs have been directed to
regulating facilities over a certain size rather than  actual
pollution.  This occurs because the governmental
provisions employ animal numbers rather the potential for
a discharge of pollutants to establish regulatory thresholds
for permits (Environmental Protection Agency, 2003). 
Several ideas exist that may facilitate reductions in
pollution without the adoption of new permit provisions
covering more CAFOs.  Regulations can differentiate
between covered and noncovered production areas,
establish management practices that exempt selected
AFOs from CAFO regulations, direct safer construction
of lagoons and manure-storage structures, and provide
distinctions based on watersheds.  These ideas serve as
foundations for further efforts by scientists, regulators,
and citizens to formulate practices and regulatory
requirements that would reduce environmental problems
from AFOs. 
Covered Versus Noncovered Production Areas
    The first idea involves regulatory controls that
distinguish between covered and noncovered production
areas.  In areas where rainfall exacerbates the
possibilities of contamination of water resources, more
stringent regulations may be appropriate for AFOs that
have uncovered confined production areas.  Facilities that
house animals in covered structures and have covered
manure storage structures may not need to be subjected
to the same requirements as facilities that allow rainwater
to mix with urine and feces in enclosed production areas.
Through the further differentiation of agronomic practices
that are more likely to be accompanied by environmental
problems, we might be able to regulate fewer producers
while attaining improved environmental quality.
Directives on Manure Management
    While governments and producers have both employed
manure management programs as a means to reduce
pollution, further consideration of an opt-out provision may
enable qualifying AFOs to avoid all of the regulations
applicable to CAFOs.  Manure management is
indispensable  to the oversight of surplus nutrients from
animal waste.  State legislatures have adopted provisions
requiring training for persons in charge of disposing of
manure and management system operators (Iowa
Administrative Code, 1999; North Carolina General
Statutes, 2000), mandating persons who apply nutrients to
land to complete an educational program (Maryland
Agriculture Code Annotated, 2001), and enumerating
topics that should be taught to operators of CAFOs
(Georgia Compiled Rules and Regulations, 2001).
Some of these state regulations are distinct from the
NPDES permit requirements.
    Some state nutrient and manure management
provisions delineate practices that foster the use of
nutrients for crop production.  Minnesota enunciates a
general prohibition against application of manure that
would cause contaminated runoff (Minnesota Rules,
2000).  On lands prone to flooding, manure application
through injection or incorporation into the soil may be
required (Iowa Administrative Code, 1999).  Similar
provisions may apply to steeply sloping cropland (Iowa
Administrative Code, 1999).  To minimize runoff of
manure, northern states limit the application of manure on
snow-covered ground (Illinois Compiled Statutes
Annotated , 2001).  Another provision may prohibit
manure application in road ditches (Minnesota Rules,
2000). 
     While these provisions serve as appropriate practices
to reduce pollution, they also might be incorporated into
eligibility criteria  that would allow qualifying producers to
be exempted from NPDES permits.  Through the
delineation of prerequisites, producers might be
encouraged to implement practices to reduce potential
pollution so they would not need to secure a governmental
permit.
Lagoons and Storage Structures
    While animal waste lagoons and storage structures are
not new, contamination of waters by lagoon collapses has
spurred greater regulations (Schmidt, 2000).  Particularly
important are the design provisions being added by many
states through legislation and agency regulations.
Advances in science have meant that the design and scale
of lagoons have changed considerably.  Lagoons have
gotten larger, corresponding to larger animal production
operations, and have incorporated new design
specifications that make them less likely to fail.  They also
may be precluded from environmentally sensitive
locations, such as a 100-year flood plain (Georgia
Compiled Rules and Regulations, 2001).
    The most common safeguards embody professional
requirements for persons involved in designing manure
storage structures and lagoons.  Generally, the regulatory
provisions establish a requirement of design preparation
by a professional engineer (Minnesota Rules, 2000).
Common design specification concerns lagoon liners,
lagoon capacity, and installation of groundwater
monitoring wells.  Due to the release of ammonia and
odors from animal waste lagoons, some states are moving
to prohibitions.  North Carolina plans to eliminate the use
of open-air lagoons entirely.  A second idea, incorporated
in a Georgia rule for swine operations with more than
3,000 animal units, is to prohibit new swine CAFOs from
having an uncovered lagoon (Georgia Compiled Rules
and Regulations , 2001).  Other provisions require
security that could be used to respond to problems when
the storage facility is closed (Centner, 2002).
    The adoption of appropriate manure storage provisions,
along with appropriate inspection and enforcement
actions, may eliminate some pollution problems.
 
Watersheds
    Water pollution from nitrogen and phosphorus is not
necessarily connected to the size of an individual CAFO.
Rather, the problem involves the location of excess
nutrients and the impairment of water resources.  While
authority exists for governments to take action and
prevent future problems, it can be argued that more
exacting regulations are needed only in areas where there
are problems. 
    Thus, concern about nitrogen and phosphorus pollution
from CAFOs suggests a response that would match
impaired waters (and watersheds) with CAFO
proscriptions.  Drawing upon the European Union’s
nitrate directive (Council of the European Communities,
1991), the United States might format more stringent
regulations for areas where animal production is a
contamination problem.  Rather than regulating more
CAFOs under NPDES permits, regulators might employ
an abbreviated registry system drawing upon precision
farming technology and geographical information systems
to pinpoint actual contamination problems.  Regulations
containing individualized responses for eliminating
contaminants could be applicable only in regions or
watersheds with nutrient problems. 
ENFORCING EXISTING REGULATIONS
    Governments and agencies enact regulations in
response to society’s desire to control activities and
conduct.  But the enactment of a regulation without more
enforcement cannot be expected to achieve its objectives.
Suitable provisions for deterrence must be incorporated
into the regulations and adequate enforcement
mechanisms must be implemented.  Enforcement must
consist of detecting violations, prosecuting, and punishing
violators.  Potential offenders must rationalize that the
likelihood of being caught and punished for violating a
regulation is more reprehensible than the benefits that
accrue from violating the regulation. 
    Existing legal provisions governing AFOs enumerate
two categories of potential violations.  Any unpermitted
discharge of pollutants from a point source into the waters
of the United States constitutes a violation.  This could
involve a lagoon rupture.  The failure to secure a required
NPDES permit or a breach of the conditions set forth in
a permit also constitute offenses. 
    Under the cooperative federalism incorporated in the
Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency
commissions states to administer and enforce federal
laws.  State agencies are authorized through an annual
agreement known as a Memorandum of Agreement or a
Memorandum of Understanding (Riesel, 1996).  State
administrative agencies monitor firms for compliance and
can issue citations and reach agreement with violators for
voluntary payments of fines and other appropriate
procedures. 
    However, the enforcement of violations is not handled
by the state monitoring agency.  Rather, alleged violations
must be referred to the state attorney general or other
enforcement agency.  The enforcing agency determines
which violations shall be prosecuted.  The prosecuting
agency must prove that a regulation was violated, and,
upon proof of a violation, the judicial tribunal must impose
a penalty.  These multiple actors mean that augmenting
environmental quality may involve more than simply
enlarging the class of regulated firms.  Changes affecting
monitoring, the ability to detect violations, and the
willingness to prosecute all impact regulatory compliance.
    Data from the Environmental Protection Agency
suggest that nearly 80% of CAFOs have failed to timely
secure required permits (Environmental Protection
Agency, 2001a, p. 3080).  Moreover, informal
communications by states note that they lack the
personnel and financial resources to monitor and
prosecute violations of CAFO regulations (Environmental
Protection Agency, 2001b).  Under the data employed by
the Environmental Protection Agency in 2001 to propose
new regulations for CAFOs, operators would incur
between $226-298 million in pre-tax compliance costs
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2001a, p. 3124).
Since the Environmental Protection Agency’s proposal
suggested regulating 12,880 to 26,660 additional CAFOs,
an average operator might be expected to incur between
$11,177 and $17,546 to comply.  Given the size of these
expected costs, the benefits accruing to CAFOs foregoing
compliance are considerable.  
    Given current enforcement conditions and calculated
compliance costs, it may be concluded that existing
regulations as well as proposals to increase the number of
regulated CAFOs masy not constitute an optimal response
to the environmental problem of pollution by AFOs.  The
expansion of the number of regulated firms under broad
regulations characterized by low compliance may cause
environmental quality to decline (Mullen and Centner,
2003).   This may occur if firms decide not to comply with
the regulatory commands.  Rather than expanding the
number of operations regulated as CAFOs, governments
might consider augmenting their enforcement efforts.
Modest increases in funds available for monitoring
CAFOs and more assertive enforcement may be more
beneficial to improving our water quality than reforms that
seek to  expand the numbers of permittees. 
CONCLUSION
    Additional research and careful drafting may allow
regulators to devise regulations that are more effective at
curtailing pollutants from entering waterbodies while
regulating fewer firms.  Through more definitive
provisions, and greater enforcement, we might direct
regulations at existing discharges and actual pollutants  so
that fewer firms would need to be subjected to costly
permitting regulations.
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